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Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez: A New Approach to
Damages Awards in New Mexico
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, New Mexico became the second state to hold that the parents
of a healthy child born as the result of a hospital's negligent failure to
perform an effective sterilization procedure are entitled to damages for
the cost of raising the child to adulthood.' A majority of jurisdictions
limit the damages awarded for negligently performed sterilization procedures to the expenses and pain and suffering that are directly associated
with the mother's pregnancy, birth, and subsequent successful sterilization
procedure. 2 Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez is noteworthy for four
reasons.' First, it extends recovery in negligent sterilization suits beyond
the norm by allowing full child rearing costs. 4 Second, it denies the offset
or mitigation of these damages.5 Third, it only allows recovery for the
pain and suffering directly associated with the pregnancy and birth of
the child. It does not allow damages for pain and suffering associated
with the financial and emotional burdens of caring for an additional
family member. 6 Fourth and most important, it presents a formula that,
aside from supporting its holding in this case, serves as a tool for
evaluating when damages should and should not be recoverable. 7 For
1. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (mother received negligent
tubal ligation). Wisconsin was the first state to allow such damages for the cost of raising a child
in a wrongful conception medical malpractice action. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243
(Wis. 1990).
This medical malpractice claim is a wrongful conception or pregnancy claim, because conception
and pregnancy resulted from a physician's negligence. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 348-349, 805 P.2d at
615. Wrongful conception claims should be distinguished from wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims. Id. Wrongful life claims are brought by a child who is born unhealthy or abnormal due
to a physician's negligence. Id. Wrongful birth claims are brought by the parents of such a child.
Id.
2. See infra notes 8-23 and accompanying text; see also David J. Burke, Comment, Wrongful
Pregnancy: Child Rearing Damages Deserve Full Judicial Consideration, 8 PACE L. Rav. 313 (1988).
3. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 341-42, 805 P.2d at 609-10. The first portion of the supreme court
opinion, which is not the topic of this comment, dealt with whether the court of appeals had
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal although it granted certiorari after the expiration of the
twenty day period provided by statute. Id. at 337-341, 805 P.2d at 604-608; see also N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 39-3-4 (1978). The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' jurisdiction by acknowledging
that the legislature had the constitutional authority to limit appellate courts' jurisdiction to hear
interlocutory appeals. It then concluded that the legislature did not intend to control jurisdiction
when it promulgated N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4, but rather, intended that the statute serve only
a "housekeeping" purpose. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 339, 805 P.2d at 606.
4. Lovelace, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603. See infra notes 8-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
6. Lovelace, 11 N.M. at 347, 353, 805 P.2d at 614, 620. Lovelace explained that this was
because the "intangible benefits and burdens a child provides are too speculative" and because
allowing such damages "encourag[es] parents to denigrate their children. . ." and "encourage[s] the
parties and the jury to engage in distasteful moral determinations." Id. at 353, 805 P.2d at 620.
To date, only one jurisdiction even implies that such damages are proper. See Burke v. Rivo, 551
N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1990), discussed infra note 96.
7. As a practical matter, the formula may also serve as a tool for analyzing the strength of
a litigant's claim.
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these reasons, Lovelace provides much more than just a precedent for
future wrongful conception cases; it will be useful in arguing and deciding
a wide variety of tort claims in the future.
This Comment briefly reviews the recoverability of damages for wrongful conception negligence in other jurisdictions. It then presents the New
Mexico Supreme Court's holding in Lovelace, examines its well-reasoned
formula for determining when damages should and should not be allowed,
and critiques its application to the Mendezes' claim. 8 Finally, this Comment applies the formula to a hypothetical case in order to evaluate its
usefulness in arguing and deciding other damages claims.
II. THE WORLD BEFORE LOVELACE V. MENDEZ:
WRONGFUL CONCEPTION DAMAGES ALLOWED IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
The highest courts of most states have heard wrongful conception
claims, and have made decisions about the types of damages that should
and should not be allowed. While nearly every state allows recovery for
the pain and suffering and costs associated with the unwanted pregnancy
and birth itself, a majority of states deny recovery for child rearing
costs. 9 Most states that deny child rearing costs cite public policy-related
reasons for doing so. Their explanations of policy differ, however.
Some state courts have held that the birth of a healthy child is simply
not an injury to its parents.' 0 A Florida court explained that since the
child's birth is not an injury, and since the child is the parents' and not
the physician's, the legal obligation of raising it rests with the parents."
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that allowing parents to transfer the
cost of rearing the child to the physician goes against the policy of
preserving family relations.' 2 The Arkansas Supreme Court explained that
allowing child rearing costs would turn the child into an:
"emotional bastard," who will someday learn that its parents did not
want it and, in fact, went to court to force somebody else to pay
for its raising, [and that this] will be harmful to that child. It will
undermine society's need for a strong and healthy family relationship. 3
Another group of states bases its denial of child rearing costs on the
theory that the benefits of a healthy child outweigh the burdens.' 4 Washington denied child rearing costs because, in order to be entitled to them,
parents would be required to show that the child would be "more trouble

8. Lovelace, III N.M. at 342-347, 805 P.2d at 609-614.
9. See infra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
10. See O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1985); Fulton-De Kalb Hosp. Auth.
v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654-55 (Ga. 1984); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. 1982).
It.Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
12. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Ill. 1983).
13. Wilber v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982).
14. See McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d
288, 292 (Wyo. 1982); Narnke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522-23 (Iowa 1984); Mason v. W. Penn.
Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Penn. 1982).
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than it was worth." 5 A couple of state courts have explained that it is
simply bad policy to attempt to measure the monetary value of a human
life against its costs. 16 The District of Columbia considers child rearing
costs to be one of the "highly personal matters that seem particularly
unsuited for the traditional
adversarial process of a negligence action in
17
a court of law.'
A few states deny child rearing damages because they find it impossible
to measure them. Utah, Washington and Wyoming have all found such
damages too speculative to calculate. 8 The Virginia Supreme Court explained that "a court or jury is not capable of determining with any
reasonable certainty the costs of bringing a child to maturity less the
offsetting value of the child's life."' 19
Still other states deny recovery for child rearing costs "based on public
20
policy" without explaining the specific reasons which preclude recovery.
Kentucky's Supreme Court found the question of recovery for child
rearing damages in a wrongful conception action to be one of public
policy, and refused to decide it, because the Kentucky legislature had
not addressed
the public policy issue of whether such damages would be
21
proper.
Finally, Nevada recently denied recovery for all damages sought in a
wrongful conception lawsuit, based on the rationale that "the birth of
a normal child is not a civil wrong for which the court will provide a
remedy in the form of an action for damages."22 The Nevada court
explained that tort actions are only properly maintained when the plaintiff
actually suffers injuries. 23 Since the birth of a healthy child was not an
injury, the parents had no viable negligence action.2 The court, in dicta,
held it would have been proper for the parents to seek damages
for their
25
financial losses in a breach of contract action instead.
A minority of jurisdictions allows child rearing damages in wrongful
conception cases, but requires these damages to be offset by the value
of the emotional benefits which the unplanned child presumably confers

15. McKernan, 687 P.2d at 855.
16. See Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12
(Del. 1975).
17. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. 1984).
18. See C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 516 (Utah 1988); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850,
855 (Wash. 1984); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982); see also Jackson v.
Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743, 749-50 (N.C. 1986).
19. Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 307 (Va. 1986).
20. See Johnson v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989); Rinard v. Biczak,
441 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987); Smith v.
Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751 (Tenn. 1987); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986);
P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (N.J. 1981).
21. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
22. Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1986).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1079.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 23

on its parents. 26 The Minnesota court noted that "it would seem myopic
to declare ... that th[e] benefits [of having a child] exceed the costs
as a matter of law." ' 27 The courts that allow damages to be diminished

by offsetting benefits must deal with the issue of calculating the value
of the emotional benefits which the child will confer on its parents.
Wisconsin's supreme court was the first to hold that the parents of
a healthy child who bring a wrongful conception case should be entitled
to recover child rearing costs without offsetting for benefits. 2 The Wisconsin court found it would not be equitable to apply the principle of
offsetting damages in a wrongful conception case. 29 Since the parents
presumably knew what emotional benefits they were giving up by deciding
not to have more children, it would be unfair "to not only force this
benefit upon them but to tell them they must pay for it as well

.

.. 30

Wisconsin also refused to hold the parents responsible for not mitigating
their damages because they did not terminate the pregnancy with abortion
or put their child up for adoption .3 Other jurisdictions that have considered mitigation of damages as a defense in wrongful conception suits
have also concluded that it would impose inappropriate burdens on the
parents. 32

New Mexico followed Wisconsin in allowing recovery for child rearing
costs while precluding their offset.3 3 Lovelace held that child rearing costs
cannot be offset by the value of emotional benefits that an unplanned
birth presumably confers on the parents.34 Lovelace also followed Wisconsin in concluding that the plaintiffs in a wrongful pregnancy suit
by
cannot be held responsible for failing to mitigate their damages
35
adoption.
for
up
child
the
putting
or
abortion
obtaining an
26. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md.
1984); Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Ariz. 1983) (en
banc); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1977); see also Sandra Gooding Sylvia, Comment, One More Mouth to Feed: A Look at
Physicians' Liability for the Negligent Performance of Sterilization Operations, 25 ARiz. L. REv.
1069 (Fall 1983); Philip Braverman, Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for Bringing Up Baby?,
47 FosDH-m L. REV. 418 (1978).
27. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175-76.
28. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 NW.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
29. Id. at 249.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 247.
32. See Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v.
Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.
1977).
33. See Lovelace v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991).
34. Id. at 347, 352-53, 805 P.2d at 614, 619-620. The court found that it would contradict
public policy to allow recovery for the emotional distress associated with having an unexpected
child, and held that it would be unfair to consider emotional benefits while ignoring emotional
burdens. Id. at 346, 805 P.2d at 613; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text and infra notes
101-103 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 347, 353-54, 805 P.2d at 614, 620-21. The supreme court adopted the court of appeals'
position. Id. at 341, 805 P.2d at 608. The parents' only means of mitigating the cost of raising a
child would be to abort the child or to place it for adoption. Id. at 347, 353-54, 805 P.2d at 614,
622-23. The court held simply that it would be against public policy to consider whether parents
should have taken such options. Id. The court avoided discussion of whether the Mendezes might
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THE LOVELACE MEDICAL CENTER V. MENDEZ OPINION
AND FORMULA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Important as the court's holding may be to New Mexicans involved
in future wrongful conception cases, Lovelace's holding is not its most
important feature. The formula which Justice Montgomery presented in
reaching the holding will have a much broader impact on New Mexico
law, especially as an analytical construct for practitioners and courts to
apply to cases that present a question of recoverability for less than
conventional damages.
The Lovelace court employed traditional tort principles as well as an
innovative formula to identify "legally compensable harms" in determining whether to allow the Mendezes to recover an unconventional
category of damages. 3 6 The supreme court created and applied this formula, although it could have allowed child rearing damages based on
policy arguments alone, as the court of appeals did. 7 Perhaps the supreme
court presented the formula to strengthen its decision because it found
the policy arguments insufficient to stand alone. It is more likely that
the court seized Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez as a perfect opportunity to develop and present an analytical construct to assist practitioners and courts in bringing and deciding claims that present difficult
damage recoverability questions.
A.

The Supreme Court's Adoption of the Court of Appeals' Opinion
The supreme court began the damages portion of its opinion by affirming the court of appeals' approach to measuring damages." Because
there was no question that negligence had occurred in Lovelace and that
negligence had resulted in injury, the real issue was how to measure
damages in order to compensate the plaintiffs.3 9 The supreme court
affirmed the court of appeals' rationale that, as in all tort cases, it is
only proper to compensate the plaintiff for financial losses that were
proximately caused by the negligence and were a foreseeable result of
the negligence.40 The supreme court upheld the court of appeals' conclusion
that precluding recovery for child rearing costs would not serve any valid

have considered abortion or adoption to be reasonable, and made no conclusions about whether
proof of such subjective reasonableness might have assisted Lovelace in showing that the Mendezes
should have mitigated their damages.
36. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 342-347, 805 P.2d at 609-614 (opinion of Montgomery, J.) (injury
and harm formula discussion).
37. Id. at 342-354, 805 P.2d at 609-621.
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609. The court of appeals noted that in order to
reconcile the pertinent issues brought before it on an interlocutory appeal of a motion for partial
summary judgment, the court would assume that the Mendezes had shown liability although they
had not yet done so before a trial court. Id. at 347, 805 P.2d at 614.
40. Id. at 349, 805 P.2d at 616 (opinion of Alarid, J., adopted by the supreme court at Ill
N.M. 341, 805 P.2d 608).
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policy rationales. 41 It agreed that the family's interests are only truly
burdens of raising a child are recognized and
valued when the economic
42
held compensable.
The supreme court opinion was not entirely repetitive of the court of
appeals' opinion, however. It took exception with Judge Alarid's definition
of "injury" as the wrongful act or tort itself, and also with his conclusion43
that the injury in Lovelace "consisted of the physician's wrongful acts."
The supreme court explained that the tort, or wrongful act, is not the
same thing as the injury."4 The wrongful act occurs first. 45 The injury
is the harm that results from the wrongful act." In Lovelace, the hospital's
wrongful acts were performing the sterilization procedure negligently and
then failing to notify Mrs. Mendez that the procedure had not been
successfully completed and that she was still fertile. 47 The injuries resulting

from the wrongful acts are different, and must be considered separately.
The supreme court defined the Mendezes' injuries
in the third step of
4
a four-step formula first announced in this case.
B.

The Lovelace Formula

The supreme court set up and applied a four-step formula for assessing
recoverability of damages in tort. First, this formula defines wrongful

acts and identifies those which occur .49 Second, it defines harm and
analyzes whether the wrongful act results in harm. Third, it determines
whether the law defines the identified harm as a legally compensable

41. Id. at 350-352, 805 P.2d at 617-19 (opinion of Alarid, J., adopted by the supreme court
at Ill N.M. 341, 805 P.2d 608); see also supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text (discussion of
policies for precluding recovery).
42. Id. at 352, 805 P.2d at 619 (opinion of Alarid, J.,adopted by the supreme court at III
N.M. 341, 805 P.2d 608).
43. Id. at 341, 805 P.2d at 608 n.5 (emphasis added); see also id. at 351, 805 P.2d at 618
(Judge Alarid's discussion of injury).
Judge Alarid's interpretation of "injury" was based on Clark v. Cassetty, where the court contrasted
"injury" with "damage" by explaining that "injury means something done against the right of-the
party, producing damage, whereas damage is the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason of
the injury." Clark, 71 N.M. 89, 92, 376 P.2d 37, 40 (1962) (Clark sued Cassetty for igniting Clark's
wheat fields after negligently driving his truck onto Clark's property with a defective muffler).
Judge Alarid used the term "injury" in Lovelace to explain Mendez's harms. Lovelace, I l I N.M.
at 351, 805 P.2d at 618. He explained that the injury was "the doctor's act in only ligating one
fallopian tube and then failing to inform Maria Mendez that she ... should continue using some
means of birth control." Id. Alarid's definition of the term injury led to the practical conclusion
that all damages proximately caused by or foreseeably resulting from the doctor's negligence should
be recoverable. Id.
44. Id. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609 (the supreme court interpreted Clark differently than did the
court of appeals).
45. Id.
46. Id. In Clark, the wrongful act of driving with a defective muffler caused the resulting injury
of destroying Clark's wheat, 71 N.M. at 92, 376 P.2d at 39. The court also relied on the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS for definitions of harm and injury. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying
text.
47. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609.
48. See infra notes 47-103 and accompanying text.
49. The court stressed the difference between wrongful acts and resulting injuries because the
determination of each is a separate step of the formula.
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injury. Finally, it decides whether to allow damages to compensate for
the injury. An explanation of the formula and examination of its application to each step of the Mendezes' claim against Lovelace follows.
1. The "Wrongful Act"
According to Lovelace, the court must first define the defendant's
wrongful acts, and then determine whether the law provides those affected
5
thereby with any viable causes of action as a means of recourse.
Lovelace's wrongful acts included tying only one of Mrs. Mendez's
5
fallopian tubes and then failing to warn her that she was still fertile. '
New Mexico tort law provided the Mendezes with a5 2viable negligence
action as a means of recourse for Lovelace's actions.
2. The Resulting "Harm" to Plaintiff
Second, the court decided whether any harm had resulted from the
wrongful acts that took place." The key to understanding this step and
the next, lies in understanding the different definitions the court assigned
to "harm" and "injury. ' 54 For this reason, the court's definition of
both terms will be explained here, although the determination of whether
a harm is also a legally compensable injury is not made until the next
step of the formula.
The supreme court adopted the Restatement's definitions of harm and
injury.55 The Restatement defines harm as "a loss or detriment in fact
of any kind to a person resulting from any cause." 5 6 The comments,
cited by the supreme court, describe harm further:
[H]arm ... is the detriment or loss to a person which occurs by
virtue of, or as a result of, some alteration or change in his person,
or in physical things, and also the detriment resulting to him from
acts or conditions which impair his physical, emotional, or aesthetic
rights, his repuwell-being, his pecuniary advantage, his intangible
7
tation, or his other legally recognized interests.
As the definition illustrates, wrongful acts can cause a vast array of
harms.
Injuries are a more narrow subcategory of harms, defined by the
Restatement as "invasion[s] of any legally protected interest of another." 58
Thus, injuries are those harms which are legally compensable. The fact
that a wrongful act harms an individual does not in itself warrant legal
compensation. A harm only becomes an "injury" after a court concludes
50. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
53. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610.
54. Id.
55. Id.;see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965).
56. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2)
(1965)).
57. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) cmt. b (1965)).
58. Id. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(I) (1965)) (emphasis
added).
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that it is legally compensable.5 9 The "injury" determination is the third
step of the formula. Before it can be made, the court must conclude
whether a harm resulted from a wrongful act. Furthermore, it must define
that harm. If the person affected by a wrongful act has suffered a loss
or detriment that falls within the Restatement's definition, then the
wrongful act has resulted in harm.
The supreme court concluded that the Mendezes suffered two distinct
harms as a direct result of Lovelace's alleged negligence. 60 First, the court
found that Lovelace's wrongful acts compromised the Mendezes' interest
in and right to plan the size of their family. 6' Second, Lovelace's wrongful
acts harmed the Mendezes' interest in maintaining their family's financial
well being. Against their wishes, the Mendezes were placed in a position
of raising an additional child, the costs of which they stated they were
quite unable to bear. 62
3. The "Harm" of a Legally Protected Interest is an "Injury"
In the third step of the formula, the court decided whether the harm
suffered as the result of a wrongful act was an injury or merely a harm
for which the law will not compensate. Although harm was defined
63
broadly in the previous section to include nearly all types of losses,
Lovelace held that only those harms which the law recognizes as legally
compensable are truly "injuries." 64 Harms to interests that the law recognizes or protects constitute "injuries."
The court defined "legally protected interests" as those which the
common law recognizes as "worthy of legal protection. ' 6 After a court
posing this question identifies the particular interest that has been harmed,6
an examination of precedent can reveal whether
past courts considered
67
the interest to be worthy of legal protection.
The Lovelace court reviewed each of the Mendezes' harmed interests
to determine whether each constituted an "injury." 6 Relying on precedent,
the court found that the Mendezes' interest in economic stability was

59. Id. The court observed that the Restatement's differentiation between "injury" and "harm"
was "very close to, if not the same as, the distinction between 'injury' and 'damage' . . . recognized
in Clark v. Cassetty." Id. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610 n.7; see also supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
60. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610. It is important for the defendant's wrongful
act to cause the harms suffered, as they clearly did in this case.
The court applied the definition of "harm" from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs to the
Mendezes' claims, and concluded that they had suffered losses to self, personhood and property.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610.
62. Id.
63. Supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
64. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. The interests harmed were defined in the previous step of the formula. See supra notes 5960 and accompanying text.
67. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610.
68. Id. at 345-46, 805 P.2d at 612-13.
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considered worthy of protection. 69 The Mendezes' interest in controlling
70
the size of their family has also been afforded protection in many cases.
The court thus concluded that the Mendezes had suffered two injuries
at law.
4. The Law Must Provide Compensation for the "Injury"
In the fourth and final step of the formula, the court analyzed whether
the law would actually allow compensation in the form of damages for
an injured interest. Just because an interest has been deemed "worthy"
of legal protection does not mean that the law has traditionally compensated for it. The law has denied protection to a number of interests
which it has held worthy of protection. 7' Courts have denied compensation
for worthy interests when the calculation of resulting damages would
72 and when awarding damages would conrequire too much speculation
7"
tradict public policy.
a. Compensation for Injuries to Economic Stability
The court analyzed the propriety of granting compensation for injuries
to economic stability. Recognizing that courts routinely allow compensation for this injury, the Lovelace court found that the Mendezes' injury
should be compensable. 74 Following the formula, the court defined the

69. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 344, 805 P.2d at 611. The court reviewed a number of tort contexts
unrelated to the Mendezes' in which the plaintiffs' harmed economic interests formed at least a
partial basis for their claims. Id.; see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore Inc., 753 F.2d 851
(10th Cir. 1985) (allowing recovery for economic losses resulting from product liability); Schmitz
v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 399, 785 P.2d 726, 739 (1990) (allowing recovery for jeopardy to
business resulting from tortious & coercive contractual relations); Williams v. Ashcraft, 72 N.M.
120, 381 P.2d 55 (1963) (allowing recovery for economic losses resulting from tortious interference
with business relations).
The court also cited a number of negligent sterilization/wrongful conception claims in which
economic hardship was cited as one reason for allowing at least partial recovery for the costs
associated with raising the child. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 344, 805 P.2d at 611 (citing Marciniak v.
Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 1990); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Univ.
of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445
A.2d 883, 885-86 (Conn. 1982)).
70. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612. This interest has even been protected generally
on constitutional grounds. Id. (citing e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (Conn. 1982)).
71. Lovelace, III N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610. Loss of consortium and alienation of affections
are actions that recognize "worthy interests" for which New Mexico courts deny damages. Id.
72. Id. (citing Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 215-218, 387 P.2d 321, 324-26 (1963))
(Roseberry court denied recovery for loss of consortium due to the difficulty in measuring and
quantifying damages of such an intangible nature); see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text.
73. Id. (citing Thompson v. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 358, 600 P.2d 302, 304 (1979) (court
denied recovery for alienation of affections, an action brought against a third party for causing
one spouse's loss of the other spouse's affections, because the interest in maintaining spousal
affections, which the action was once thought to protect, is only harmed when the action is brought));
see also supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text.
74. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 344, 805 P.2d at 611; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text

(citing cases, including negligent sterilization/wrongful conception cases, that allow compensation
for economic injuries).
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result of the Mendezes' injury before deciding what damages to allow."
It found the result of the injury to the Mendezes' economic stability was
economic instability.7 6 The court's goal was to compensate the Mendezes
for this loss by putting them in their pre-injury position. 77 The court
to recover damages for the cost of
held that the Mendezes were entitled
78
raising their child to adulthood.

The court supported this holding with favorable precedent. 79 Its analysis
of the propriety of granting damages did not end there, however. The
court acknowledged that damages were proper for two additional reasons.
First, the amount of the loss could be calculated with relative certainty.80
Second, allowing damages did not contradict public policy. 81 The court
reached this holding after concluding 2that given the parents' motivations,
it is proper to allow such damages.1
The Lovelace court concluded that the parents' motivations in seeking
sterilization are important, but not determinative of whether they can
recover damages for child-rearing costs. 83 It held that such damages
properly compensated the Mendezes, because the record clearly indicated
that economic interest was Mrs. Mendez's primary reason for seeking
84
sterilization, and the hospital's negligent acts clearly harmed this interest.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the court struggled with the
potential impropriety of granting such damages had the plaintiff sought
sterilization for other reasons.85 The court's concern centered on whether
the plaintiff who sought sterilization to preserve interests other than
economic stability would truly be compensated for his lost interests with
a damages award intended to raise the child to adulthood.8 6 Some jurisdictions have held that such an award, under such circumstances, would
constitute a windfall. 87 The New Mexico Supreme Court was:

75. Lovelace, III N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610.
76. Id.
77. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 349, 805 P.2d at 616 (court stated that "the purpose of compensatory
damages is to make an injured person whole [or to] ... fully and fairly compensate ... for the
injuries received.").
78. Id. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612. The calculations of an economic expert aided the court in
determining a dollar amount for this cost. Id. at 348, 805 P.2d at 615.
79. Id. at 345-46, 805 P.2d at 612-13.
80. Id.
81. See Lovelace, III N.M. at 344-45, 805 P.2d at 611-12.
82. Lovelace, III N.M. at 344-45, 805 P.2d at 611-12.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612.
85. Id. at 344-45, 805 P.2d at 611-12. Some of the alternative motives hypothesized were prevention
of genetic defects and protection of the mother's health. Id. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612 (citing Jones
v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (Md. 1984)).
86. Id.
87. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court held that because the
mother's reason for seeking sterilization was therapeutic, she could not assert economic damages
for the cost of raising the child after the fact, because such an award would provide her with a
windfall).
Other jurisdictions have also held that child rearing expenses cannot be recovered unless the
parents were motivated by economic considerations to seek sterilization, due to the windfall theory.
See, e.g., Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1990); Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v.
Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Ariz. 1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (Md.
1984)).
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reluctant to hold that child-rearing expenses are recoverable only when
the parents' sole, or even primary, motivation is economic. A person's
original reasons for seeking sterilization should not be conclusive as
to whether an economic interest has been injured."'
The court further noted that "the motivation rule entails difficult tasks
for the jury in sorting out the parents' differing motivations and encourages after-the-fact reformulations of the parents' actual intentions." ' 9
The Lovelace court thus posed the difficult question of whether damage
awards should compensate only for the specific interests of the parents
that are "actually" injured as a result of negligent sterilization. 9° "Actually" injured interests are those which the parents seek to protect by
seeking sterilization. This requires the court to ascertain the parents'
motives. 9' While hinting in its opinion that only actually-injured interests
are compensable the court stopped short of providing an answer because,
for the
in this case, the damages allowed were designed to compensate
92
specific interest in economic stability which had been injured.
b. Compensation for Injuries to Independent Family Planning
The court also appraised the propriety of granting compensation for
the injury to the interest in independent family planning, and concluded
that such damages would be improper. 93 Again, the court defined the
results of the Mendezes' injury before analyzing whether to allow damages.
The court's goal was to compensate the Mendezes for the losses resulting
from this injury. 94 The direct result of the injury to the Mendezes' family
planning autonomy was that Mrs. Mendez remained fertile, conceived,
and gave birth to an additional child. 95 The consequential results of the
injury are best described as "emotional distress as the result of the
perhaps a
unwanted pregnancy" and/or birth of the child, 96 and also
97
"diminution of attention and affection to other children."
The court explained that although some jurisdictions allowed damages
to compensate for such losses, 9 it would not, for two reasons. First, it

88. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Malinowski, 473 A.2d at 436.
92. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612. The court's discussions of the compensatory
nature of damages, 111 N.M. at 349, 805 P.2d at 612, and of the problems with the motivation
rule, id., suggest that in future cases it might reject the motivation rule and allow recovery for
damages without the support of a "motivation", as long as the plaintiff's interest is worthy of
legal protection and has been injured as a proximate result of the defendant's wrongful acts.
93. Lovelace, 11l N.M. at 346-47, 805 P.2d at 613-14. The court did allow damages to compensate
for the physical and emotional pain and suffering associated with the pregnancy and birth itself.
Id. at 347, 805 P.2d at 614.
94. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
95. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610.
96. Id. at 346, 805 P.2d at 613.
97. Id.
98. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1990). The Massachusetts court held that the
parents of a child born unexpectedly as the result of an unsuccessful sterilization should be entitled
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held that compensatory damages for such injuries would be too difficult
to measure. 99 Second, it concluded that it would be bad policy to allow
them.0'0 The court reasoned. that allowing parents to seek damages for
this type of emotional distress would require proof that they suffered
psychological detriments as a result of having a child that they did not
want or expect to have. 0 ' Allowing parents to litigate such issues would
be injurious to their children. 02
Similar policy concerns caused the court to refuse to allow damages
to be offset by the benefit of having the child. 03 Because it would
contradict public policy to allow recovery for emotional burdens, the4
court reasoned that it would be unfair to consider emotional benefits.'0
The court also stated that it was inconsistent to allow compensatory
damages for the injury to economic stability to be offset by the benefits
that were intended to mitigate damages for the injured interest in family
planning.105
IV.

DISCUSSION AND APPLICATION OF THE LOVELACE
FORMULA

The Mendezes' injuries stemmed from the invasion of two protected
interests-economic stability and autonomous family planning. The supreme court, in determining whether to allow compensation for these
injuries, provided a formula that could be applied to any interest which
a plaintiff alleges has been harmed. The formula serves as a yardstick
for concluding that damages should, or should not, compensate for a
harmed interest.
In review, the formula has four steps. First, the plaintiff must define
the defendant's wrongful acts, and must assert a viable cause of action
against him.' °0 Second, using the court's definition of harms, the plaintiff
must ascertain that the wrongful act caused harm to the plaintiff. 0 7 Third,
relying on precedent, the plaintiff must conclude that the defendant's

to damages not just for economic costs associated with the birth and with raising the child, but
also for:
the wife's pain and suffering in connection with the pregnancy and birth and with
the second sterilization procedure . . . [and] for emotional distress [the parents]
sustained as a result of the unwanted pregnancy.
Id. at 3-4. Burke also allowed offsetting benefits. Id.; see also supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
99. See Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 346, 805 P.2d at 613.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id.; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 346, 805 P.2d at 613. In effect, it is impossible to mitigate types of damages which
the court will not allow.
105. Id. (emotional burdens and benefits are results of the injury to family planning, not economic
stability). Courts that allow offsetting of damages inadvertently mix theories by allowing damages
under one theory and then offsetting them under another theory. The court discussed Jones v.
Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 53-62.
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wrongful acts caused harm to an interest which the law will protect.
Only then can the plaintiff's harm be defined as an injury at law. I08
Finally, the plaintiff must support the assertion that damages should be
allowed to compensate for the injury. Damages should be allowed when
precedent would support an award, when the amount of damages can
be calculated with reasonable certainty, and when awarding damages
would not constitute bad public policy.'09 Just as the plaintiff can use
these steps to bring a claim, the defendant and court can use them as
a checklist of the validity of claims.
The court mentioned but did not address the recoverability of a number
of harmed interests that the Mendezes did not allege." 0 These interests
have been raised in other cases, but the courts deciding them did not
use formulas similar to Lovelace's to aid their decisions. The remainder
of this section will apply the Lovelace formula to a hypothetical, as a
test of its usefulness and workability.
Assume that a couple seeks sterilization to prevent genetic birth defects.
As a result of negligent sterilization, they have a child with birth defects.
This hypothetical presents damage recoverability issues that were not
present in Lovelace. Like Lovelace, however, the interests injured would
be the same as the actual injuries that resulted from the negligence. As
in Lovelace, the defendant's wrongful acts would be performing the
sterilization improperly and not telling the mother she was still fertile.
This would give the parents a viable cause of action for negligence."'
It is clear that the wrongful acts also caused harm to the hypothetical
parents. Using Lovelace's analysis, it would be necessary to ask the
parents which of their interests had been invaded. The losses asserted2
by the parents would serve as a basis for defining their harmed interests."
Following the Lovelace opinion, the parents would assert losses to their
interests in family planning, economic stability, and physical and emotional
well-being. The loss of one's right to plan a family is a harm, as is the
loss of one's economic stability.' The loss of physical and emotional4
well-being during the pregnancy and birth is also a definable harm. '
Distinct from losses during the pregnancy would be the loss of emotional

108. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 71-105.
110. These include the mother's interest in not having a child when doing so would endanger
her health, Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612, and the parents' interest in not having
a child when genetic deformities would clearly result. Id. The court reserved judgment on whether
it would allow recovery for emotional distress if the child were born with birth defects. Id. at 347,
805 P.2d at 614 n.9.
111. In addition, it could give rise to a cause of action for wrongful life brought by the deformed
child. See, e.g., Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987); Johnston v. Elkinds, 736 P.2d 935
(Kan. 1987); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987).
112. See Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 343, 805 P.2d at 610. The court's conclusion that the Mendezes'
harmed interests included economic stability and right to family planning were based on the Mendezes'
complaints. The court also dealt with emotional distress and pain and suffering because the Mendezes
had asserted those harms. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 347, 805 P.2d at 614; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) cmt. b (1965)
(harm is defined to include the impairment of physical, emotional and aesthetic well-being).
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well-being resulting from having and raising a child with birth defects.- 5
loss is consistent with the Lovelace court's catagorization
This hypothetical
116
of harm.
The next step would be to determine whether each of these harmed
interests is one which the law recognizes as legally compensable. The
harms to economic stability and right to family planning are clearly
injuries." 7 Courts also find the interests in physical and emotional wellbeing to be worthy of legal protection." 8 Thus, the hypothetical parents'
physical pain and suffering and emotional distress would also be injuries
at law.
If it follows Lovelace, a court deciding this hypothetical would analyze
the recoverability of damages for the parents' injuries separately." 9 If
their complaint correctly alleged that their economic stability had been
injured, they would be entitled to compensation for this injury. 20 To
award damages, the court should define the results of this injury and
should decide what would put the parents in a pre-injury position. 12' The
parents of a child born with birth defects would probably have to pay
greater costs to raise him to adulthood than the parents of a healthy
child would. However, the court would likely award damages only in an
amount that could be calculated with reasonable certainty. 22 The certainty
of such damages would depend upon how much the parents knew about
the extent of the child's condition.
If it were apparent that the child would not be capable of caring for
himself as an adult, a court might also consider allowing damages to
compensate the parents for the cost of paying for such care. Such an
award could be based on the theory that the doctor who performed the
operation should have been aware that such costs were a probable consequence of his negligence. 23 The propriety of allowing such damages
hinges on their foreseeability. 24 Since "reasonable foreseeability" is a
jury issue, 2 this question is best answered by a jury.
115. Id. at 347, 805 P.2d at 614 n.9 (court did not decide whether it would allow recovery for
emotional distress resulting from a child born with birth defects).
116. See supra notes 55-57 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) cmt. b) (harm is
defined to include the impairment of physical, emotional and aesthetic well-being as the result of
any cause).
117. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. The court relied on New Mexico and U.S.
Supreme Court precedent as well as case law from other jurisdictions.
118. New Mexico allows recovery for pain and suffering and emotional distress. See, e.g., N.M.
UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1628, 13-1807 (Repl. Pamp. 1992).
119. See supra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
120. See Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 344, 805 P.2d at 611; see also supra note 113 and accompanying
text. Presumably, if the parents had failed to allege this injury in their complaint, they would not
have been entitled to recover for it. If it found such an allegation of harm to be untrue, for
example, because the plaintiffs were so wealthy that their economic interests were not harmed by
the pregnancy or birth, the court would presumably find that no actual harm had resulted and
that no compensation should be due.
121. See supra 76-78 and 94-97 and accompanying text.
122. An expert economist can present an estimate of the special costs of raising a child with this
type of defect to adulthood. See Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 345, 805 P.2d at 612.
123. Lovelace, Ill N.M. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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On the one hand, if a jury believed that the doctor merely thought
he had been performing a normal sterilization procedure for normal
reasons, rather than to prevent serious genetic defects, it could find that
imposing damages to cover such special costs would be unfair. 26 On the
other hand, "taking the plaintiff as you find him" is a fundamental
principle applied in negligence lawsuits.
The court, following Lovelace, would likely preclude compensation for
the injury to the parents' right to plan the size of their family. 27 Also,
it would likely compensate the mother for her pain and suffering during
the pregnancy and birth. '2 Whether the parents could recover for the
injury manifested by their emotional distress would depend upon how
the court deciding their case analyzes this issue. Although Lovelace
provided no direct guidance on this particular issue, 129 it did provide a
framework for a court to use in deciding whether to allow these damages.
Emotional distress is the result of the injury to the parent's interest
in emotional well-being. The law in New Mexico allows compensation
for the injury to the parents' emotional well-being when that injury is
caused by another's negligence. 3 " Thus, the only other considerations
would be whether it is good policy to allow compensation for hypothetical
injury when it results in an unplanned birth, and whether an amount
of damages to compensate for it can be concluded with reasonable
certainty.
The policy considerations relevant to awarding damages for emotional
distress would be likely to give the court deciding this hypothetical a
difficult time. Its analysis would likely hinge on the fact that the negligence
in this case caused an arguably tragic, yet wonderful result - a new
and unplanned life. Had the negligence resulted in loss of limb or life,
no greater harm would result from compensating for the victims' concurrent emotional distress. In this instance, however, losses would not
be the sole result of the negligence. Whether tragic or wonderful, a new
life would have been created. A greater harm to the child or to the
parents' sense of duty in caring for it might very well result from
compensating the parents for the emotional damages that accompanied
the birth of their new child. Even if such harm did not result, it would
be bad public policy to ignore its potential. The Lovelace court avoided
this dilemma by allowing damages only for that emotional distress which
resulted from the events surrounding the negligent operation itself.'
Whether the court deciding this hypothetical would reach the same
conclusion depends on its willingness to rely on or to reject public policy
precedent. It is important to note that just as the Lovelace court rejected
126. Assume that a fact question exists regarding whether the doctor in this hypothetical knew
the mother's reasons for seeking the sterilization.
127. Lovelace, 111 N.M. at 346-47, 805 P.2d at 613-14.
128. Id. at 346, 805 P.2d at 613.
129. Id. at 347, 805 P.2d at 614 n.9.
130. Emotional distress is "an additional element of damages recoverable under the measure of
damages for a compensable personal injury." N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1628 (Repl.
Pamp. 1992).
131. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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public policy precedent from other jurisdictions in allowing damages for
injured economic interests, a court deciding this hypothetical might choose
to reject public policy arguments which it believed to be unsound, and
might allow damages for emotional distress to the extent that it could
justify the results as constituting sound public policy. The "public policy"
analysis should not be a mere precedent checkpoint for the court deciding
whether to allow damages. Rather, it should involve the court in an
active analysis of the effects of its decision, and should serve as a
"dragnet" for bad public policy.
Finally, there is not a set method for calculating damages for emotional
distress; it is normally the jury's role to decide what amount would
reasonably compensate the plaintiff.1 2 Of course, if the court concludes
that it would be bad policy to allow compensation for the parents' injured
interest in emotional well-being, the jury would not even be instructed
to award damages for this injury, and would not have to decide what
constituted a reasonable amount.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Lovelace opinion provides a workable formula for practitioners
and courts to use when they are involved in complex litigation issues,
and especially in assessing damages recoverability. The formula requires
litigants to find a causal connection between wrongful acts and harms,
and then to define injuries and analyze their results. When precedent
does not clearly allow compensation, or when the case presents other
countervailing concerns, it provides litigants with arguments and courts
with guidelines for allowing or precluding damages. Most important, the
formula requires litigants to match wrongful acts with causes of action,
harms with injuries, and results of injuries with the compensation that
is sought. The theories underlying each of these steps must match. The
formula leaves little room for awards based merely on the fact that a
wrong has occurred. At the same time, it provides the litigant who has
a viable cause of action with a powerful tool of logic in which to frame
his claims. Finally, it protects against "mixing" of theories, an activity
that, at least in Jones v. Malinowski, led the court. to award damages
for one injured interest (economic stability) and then to offset those
damages under another theory (emotional burdens and benefits) although
33
the court would not allow any damages based on that theory.'
LORI McCAMEY BENCOE

132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. See Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); see also supra notes 103-105 and
accompanying text.

